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Abstract
This note shows that the fixed fee oligopolistic license model developed by Kamien and
Tauman (1986) yields the result that the private returns from innovation can be greater than
the social returns when the number of firms in the industry is equal to or larger than 3. This
result implies that an innovation does not always improve welfare, even when it is profitable
for the innovator. We also show that the auction license model yields the same result as the
fixed fee.
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A widespread notion in studies on innovation and patent protection is that
the social returns from innovation (the welfare gain) are greater than the
private returns (the license income or the pro¯t earned by the innovator). In
other words, it is generally assumed that any pro¯table innovation is welfare-
improving. For example, theoretical studies on patent protection, Green and
Scotchmer (1995) and Denicolo (2000), are based on this notion.
A model under-pinning this notion that the social returns from innovation
are greater than the private returns is the one developed by Arrow (1962),
which has become famous and has been widely used in the literature.1
The reason behind this notion is familiar to us. The pro¯table innovation
increases not only the producer's surplus, but also, due to lowering the price,
increases the consumer's bene¯t which has not been appropriated by the
innovator.
However, the reason why this notion is so widespread remains unclear.2
Indeed, Arrow's results is simple, but, this simplicity depends on a factor |
the perfect competition (or monopoly).
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the proposition that the social
returns from innovation are greater than the private returns using the ¯xed
fee license model developed by Kamien and Tauman (1986). Their model
assumes that the market structure before the innovation is the textbook case
of an Cournot oligopoly with n-¯rms with identical in marginal costs.
We show the theoretically that for n ¸ 3, the patent holder can earn a
license income that is greater than the social returns from innovation. This
result implies that when the development costs are taken into account, an
innovation does not always improve overall welfare, even when it is pro¯table
for the innovator.3
1For a simple illustrations of Arrow's model, see Tirole (1990)[page. 390], and Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980).
2In fact, Katz and Shapiro (1985), for example, have developed a model consisting
of two ¯rms with non-identical costs that shows that a minor innovation by a ¯rm with
extremely high marginal costs reduces overall welfare. This result is the reverse of this
idea.
3It is a well-known fact that the amount of the license income is e®ected by many
factors, although the welfare e®ects of each type of licensing have not been fully researched.
There are many types of licensing that are more pro¯table than a ¯xed fee, as shown in
Kamien (1992). Royalties can also be more pro¯table than a ¯xed fee license, as shown in
Sen (2005).
1The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
introduce Kamien and Tauman (1986)'s model. In section 3, we compare the
private returns and the social returns, and show our results and the intuitive
reason of our result. In section 4, we shows that a similar result is obtained
in the auction model. The conclusion is in section 5.
2 Kamien and Tauman's Model and Equilibrium
The model used here is the ¯xed fee license model developed by Kamien and
Tauman (1986). The model and equilibrium are as follows.
The Model Consider an industry with n ¯rms and one patent holder. The
inverse demand function is p(Q) = a ¡ Q. The marginal costs of production
with an existing technology are c.
There is a patentee with an innovation that lowers marginal costs from c
to c¡². The patent holder can sell a license of this patent for the ¯xed fee ®.
The license income is ¼PH ´ k®, where k denotes the number of licensees.
Let us de¯ne (a ¡ c)=² as K (the larger K, the smaller ² for a given a ¡ c).
The interaction between the patent holder and n ¯rms is characterized by
the following three-stage game. In the ¯rst stage, the patent holder chooses
the value of ® at which the license is o®ered to n ¯rms. In the second stage,
each ¯rm chooses whether to buy or not to buy the license for a given value
of ®. Let S denote the set of ¯rms which choose to buy in this stage, and let
k ´ jSj. The third stage consists of \Cournot quantity competition," where
¯rm i's pro¯t without fee payment is
¼i =
(
p(Q)qi ¡ (c ¡ ²)qi for i 2 S
p(Q)qi ¡ cqi for i 62 S :
Equilibrium The game is solved by backward induction. In the third
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²(K+1)
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(2)
2In the second stage, the optimal value of k is determined.4 The optimal
values of k and ® are given by the condition ¼¤
i(k) ¡ ® ¡ ¼¤
j(k ¡ 1) = 0 for
i 2 S, and j 62 S. From this condition, we obtain
®(k) =
n²2
(n + 1)2 [2K + (n + 2) ¡ 2k]; for k · K; (3)
which yields the \private price" of the license.5
In the ¯rst stage, the patent holder maximizes ¼PH, = ®(k)k for k. The
equilibrium values of k and ¼PH are as follows:6
Let A0(K) ´ fnj2 · n · (2=3)(K + 1)g, A1(K) ´ fnj(2=3)(K + 1) ·
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: (5)
3 The Private Versus the Social Returns from Innovation
The Social Returns Now, we derive the social returns from innovation,
which are not considered by Kamien and Tauman (1986). Let W(k) denote
the overall welfare when the number of licensees is k, and let SV(k) denote
the welfare improvement from the license. That is, SV(k) ´ W(k) ¡ W(0),
where W(k) = f(a + P(Q¤(k)))=2gQ¤(k) ¡ [cQ¤(k) ¡ k²q¤
i(k)].
4Below, for simplicity of exposition, we omit the case k ¸ K.
5This equation is the same as the original equation (A.5) in Kamien and Tauman
(1986)[page. 486].
6Our equations (4) and (5) are not the same as the original equations (1) and (2) in
Kamien and Tauman (1986)[page. 475-476]. The original equations are misprinted. For
example, the original equation (1) is not in accord with the equation in their proof in
the appendix, and their original equation (2) for the case n 2 A0(K) does not yield their
numerical example of 5:12²2. Of course, our equations (4) and (5) are the correct versions.
3By substituting (1) and (2) into SV(k), we obtain















Conveniently, function (6) does not contain a constant term and takes a
similar form as ¼¤
PH = ®(k)k. We can regard ¯(k) as the \social price" of
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(8)
The Private Versus the Social Returns from Innovation Let us com-
pare ¼¤
PH(k¤) and SV(k¤).7 Let D represent the ¯xed development costs of
this technology. The innovation is pro¯table if D · ¼¤
PH. We obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) For n ¸ 3, there always exists a value of K which yields
SV(k¤) < ¼¤
PH(k¤). (ii) Directly from (i), it follows that, for n ¸ 3, there
exists a case in which the innovation is pro¯table for the innovator but reduces
overall welfare. That is, for n ¸ 3, there exists a combination of values for K
and D which satis¯es both D · ¼PH(k¤) and SV(k¤)¡D < 0 simultaneously.
proof (i) The sign of SV(k¤) ¡ ¼¤
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+ for n 2 A2(K)
(9)
B0(n;K) ´ ¡(n ¡ 2)K ¡
3
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7The direct calculation for SV(k¤) ¡ ¼¤
PH(k¤) is tedious. We can avoid this by calcu-
lating ¯(k¤)¡®(k¤) instead. The calculation of ¼¤
PH(k¤)¡SV(k¤) or ¯(k¤)¡®(k¤) both
yields Proposition 1
4The sign of B0(n;K) is negative for K ¸ (n¡2)¡1(n2 ¡(3=2)n+1) and
n ¸ 3.
It is easy to ¯nd a value for K which satis¯es n 2 A0(K) and K ¸
(n ¡ 2)¡1(n2 ¡ (3=2)n + 1). The sign of B1(n;K) is also determined.
(ii) As shown in (i), we can ¯nd a value for n and K, which satis¯es
¼¤
PH(k¤) > SV(k¤). It is obvious that ¼¤
PH(k¤) ¡ D > SV(k¤) ¡ D. Let us
consider a pro¯table innovation such as ¼¤
PH(k¤) ¡ D = 0. From this, we
obtain 0 > SV(k¤) ¡ D. [QED]
Example Consider the case n = 4 and K = 5.8 The equilibrium is k¤ = 4,
¼¤
PH(k¤) = 5:12²2, and SV(k¤) ¼ 5:28²2. Thus, in this case, ¼¤
PH(k¤) <
SV(k¤). However, the result is reversed when n = 4 and K = 6. In this case,
the equilibrium is k¤ = 4, ¼¤
PH(k¤) = 6:4²2, and SV(k¤) ¼ 6:24²2.
Intuitive Explanation We can show the the intuitive explanation of Propo-
sition 1. The key factor is the pro¯t of the ¯rm using the existing technology,
a similar to \pro¯t stealing".9
The SV is the sum of the consumer's gain and the ¯rm's gain, that is,
SV(k) ´ fCS(k) ¡ CS(0)g + fk¼i(k) + (n ¡ k)¼j(k) ¡ n¼j(0)g, for i 2 S,


















Recall that the value of ¼PH¤ is determined by k(¼¤
i(k) ¡ ¼¤
j(k ¡ 1)) which
take a close value to the second term of LHS of (12). Therefore, the value of
LHS of (12) can take a close value to SV(k¤) ¡ ¼PH¤(k¤).
The ¯rst term of RHS is the consumer's gain which is positive or zero.
But, the second term of RHS, which is the ¯rm's gain using the existing
technology, is negative, since ¼¤
j(k) is decreasing in k. Thus, if the later term
dominates the former, the sign of SV(k¤) ¡ ¼PH¤(k¤) can be negative, and
Kamien and Tauman (1986)'s model really yields such a domination.
4 Auction Licenses
8This is the case considered by Kamien and Tauman (1986)[page. 478].
9As for the pro¯t stealing and patent system, see Varian et al. (2004)(p.65-66)
5Finally, we refer to the auction model developed by Katz and Shapiro (1986).
The mathematical characteristics of the result is simpler in the auction model
than in the ¯xed fee model.
In the auction model, the amount of the license income is k(¼¤
i(k) ¡
¼¤
j(k)) = ¼PH(k). By substituting this equation into (12), we obtain, for
k · K
SV(k) ¡ ¼
























By evaluating the sign of the RHS of (13) in k¤, we obtain the following
proposition.11















(ii) For 2 < n < 1, g(n) 2 (n+1
2 ; 3n¡1
2 ).
Proposition 2(i) implies that the private returns exceeds the social one when
the cost reduction of the innovation is small (K < g(n)), and vis versa.
Proposition 2(ii) implies the threshold value g(n) locates in the interval
(n+1
2 ; 3n¡1
2 ) which is exactly equal to the interior of the interval of K of
the second case of (14).
5 Conclusion and Remark
10For the equation (14), see Kamien (1992)
11The proof is in Appendix.
6This paper reconsidered the idea | ¯rst formally presented by Arrow (1962)
and uncritically accept in many studies | that any pro¯table innovation
leads to an improvement in welfare. The analysis was based on the ¯xed fee
oligopolistic model developed by Kamien and Tauman (1986). We ¯nd that
for n ¸ 3, the patent holder can earn a license income that is greater than
the social returns from the innovation.
Note also that our result is obtained from a very simple model. No
complicated model is required to analyze a kind of the \excessive" private
returns or \insu±cient" social returns | a topic on which little research has
been done.
Our result may also throw a new light on the e®ects of spillovers. Aoki
and Tauman (2001), for example, have shown that spillovers from licensing
do not always reduce the incentive to license, but always reduce the license
income. We may expect spillovers to correct for excessive private returns and
raise the overall welfare of society.
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7Appendix
A Calculations for W(k)
As shown in the previous part, the de¯nition of W(k) is





i(k);for k · K: (15)
Among the terms of (15), q¤
i is given by (1), and Q¤ is given by kq¤
i +(n¡k)q¤
j
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The social value (SV(k)) is










































The equation (18) is the equation (6) in the main text.
B Proof of Proposition 2
(i) At ¯rst, let determine the value of two terms of the RHS of (13) for k · K.
The value of the ¯rst term is
CS(k) ¡ CS(0) =
²2k
2(n + 1)2(k + 2nK) (19)








(n + 1)2(2K ¡ k) (20)
which is obtained from (9b) shown in Kamien (1992).
Next, we determine the sign of SV(k) ¡ ¼PH(k) in the equilibrium value
















The equilibrium value of k is shown in (14). By substituting (14) into the
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¡ for K ¸ 3n¡1
2
¡orzero for K ¸ g(n)
+ for K < g(n)
+ for n+1
2 ¸ K
for n > 2: (22)
The formula (22) is that of Proposition 2.
Some calculation yields g(n) < (3n¡1)=2 for n ¸ 3, g(n) > (n+1)=2 for
n > 2. Therefore, we obtain (n + 1)=2 < g(n) < (3n ¡ 1)=2 for n > 2.
(ii) We obtain g(n) 2 (n+1
2 ; 3n¡1
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